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Avoiding Flights of Fancy: Determining Venue for Crimes
Committed During Commercial Flights
Introduction
For many years, commercial air flight existed as a luxury available only
to an elite class of travelers.1 Commercial travel has since evolved into a
modern convenience, with nearly three million passengers flying in or out
of airports in the United States every day.2 In recent years, major airline
carriers have reduced the number of commercial flights while
simultaneously increasing the number of available passenger seats.3 This
changing travel landscape means that more passengers are flying together
on larger, jam-packed flights. Unsurprisingly, these conditions can easily
create the perfect environment for “air rage” incidents between passengers.4
One such incident occurred in 2015 between passengers seated in the
back two rows of a plane heading from Minneapolis to Los Angeles.5
Monique Lozoya, who claimed she was just trying to get some sleep on the
flight, confronted the passenger sitting directly behind her after he
repeatedly jostled her seat.6 After a tense confrontation, Lozoya struck the
other passenger in the face.7 Flight attendants intervened and kept the peace
between the passengers until the plane landed at Los Angeles International
Airport (“LAX”).8 The parties had agreed to meet there to discuss the
incident, but Lozoya instead left the airport without meeting with or
apologizing to the passenger she had struck.9 Three weeks later, an FBI
agent who had investigated the incident issued a violation notice to Lozoya,
1. Sam McManis, When Luxury Ruled the Skies: Flying in the 1950s and ‘60s, CHI.
TRIB. (Sept. 15, 2014, 7:20 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/travel/sns-mct-bc-cnsairlines-sixties-20140915-story.html.
2. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., AIR TRAFFIC BY THE NUMBERS 6 (2019),
https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/by_the_numbers/media/Air_Traffic_by_the_Numbers_2019.
pdf.
3. Id.
4. Kate Silver, Air Rage Incidents Are on the Rise. First-Class Sections Aren’t
Helping, WASH. POST (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/travel/airrage-incidents-are-on-the-rise-first-class-sections-arent-helping/2017/01/23/4e3e6752-dd9911e6-918c-99ede3c8cafa_story.html.
5. United States v. Lozoya, 920 F.3d 1231, 1233 (9th Cir.), reh'g en banc granted, 944
F.3d 1229 (9th Cir. 2019), and on reh'g en banc, No. 17-50336, 2020 WL 7064635 (9th Cir.
Dec. 3, 2020).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1233–34.
8. See id. at 1234.
9. Id.

371

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021

372

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:371

charging her with misdemeanor assault in the Central District of
California.10 The Ninth Circuit ultimately overturned Lozoya’s conviction,
citing improper venue because the government charged Lozoya in the
district where the plane landed rather than the district above which the
assault actually occurred.11
Typically, venue in federal criminal cases is proper in only one district—
the district in which the accused committed the crime.12 When the criminal
behavior takes place across multiple districts or involves interstate
commerce, however, venue is proper in any district in which the behavior
was “begun, continued, or completed.”13 Criminal behavior on airplanes
presents a novel question related to venue: can the government prosecute
the accused in the district where the plane lands, or is the government
required to determine the plane’s location at the time of the assault and
bring charges in the district lying thousands of feet below that point?
Following the Ninth Circuit’s recent opinion in Lozoya, courts are split on
the answer.14
Importantly, the rule that ultimately prevails will implicate venue rules
for all other non-continuous “sky crimes.”15 The prevailing rule will also
inform prosecutions for sexual assault on airplanes,16 conduct which
increased by over sixty-five percent from 2014 to 2017.17 It will also apply
to crimes committed against children,18 hundreds of thousands of whom fly
unaccompanied every year.19 And it will apply to assaults between unruly

10. Id.
11. Id. at 1243.
12. United States v. Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1, 5 (1998).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) (2018).
14. A few days before this Comment was published, the en banc Ninth Circuit issued its
opinion without oral argument. See United States v. Lozoya, No. 17-50336, 2020 WL
7064635 (9th Cir. Dec. 3, 2020). The en banc court held that venue for the assault was
proper in the Central District of California where the plane landed. See id. at *8. Though this
Comment focuses on the Ninth Circuit's original opinion, the crux of the court's en banc
opinion—that 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) applies to crimes committed on commercial aircrafts—is
largely consistent with the arguments set forth in this Comment. See id. at *4–5.
15. Lozoya, 920 F.3d at 1244 (Owens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
16. Id.
17. See This Week: Reports of Sexual Assaults Aboard Aircraft on the Rise, FED.
BUREAU INVESTIGATION (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.fbi.gov/audio-repository/ftw-podcastsexual-assault-aboard-aircraft-042618.mp3/view.
18. See Lozoya, 920 F.3d at 1244 (Owens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
19. Michelle Higgins, When Children Fly Alone, Who’s in Charge?, N.Y. TIMES (May
13, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/13/travel/13prac.html.
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passengers, where alcohol is often a compounding factor.20 Therefore, it is
imperative that courts choose a workable rule that preserves the integrity of
the justice system while protecting an accused person’s constitutional right
to trial in the district where the crime occurred.
Part I of this Comment discusses the constitutional requirements and
underlying policies of venue. Part II illustrates how each of the three
branches of government plays a pivotal role in serving these underlying
policies. Part III explores the added complexity introduced when courts try
to apply the traditional venue framework to criminal activity committed on
commercial flights. This section compares the Ninth Circuit’s more rigid
interpretation of venue requirements in Lozoya with the less literal approach
of the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits. Part IV articulates the shortcomings of
both of these inflexible approaches to determining proper venue for sky
crimes. Part V advocates for a functional, flexible approach that will both
avoid absurd results and respect underlying venue policies better than either
existing approach.
I. Constitutional Requirements and Venue Policies
The significance of venue in criminal proceedings pre-dates the founding
of our nation.21 Early American colonists feared that the British Parliament
would attempt to prosecute them for criminal behavior, including treason,
in the English courts.22 The Declaration of Independence articulated their
fears, enumerating King George’s attempts at “transporting [colonists]
beyond Seas to be tried” as one of the twenty-seven grievances in the
document.23
The Framers valued the concept of venue so highly that they included it
in the Constitution twice.24 Article III of the Constitution guarantees venue
protection on a state level.25 It provides that “the Trial of all Crimes, except
20. See INT’L AIR TRANSP. ASS’N, ANNUAL REVIEW 32 (2017), https://www.iata.org/
contentassets/c81222d96c9a4e0bb4ff6ced0126f0bb/iata-annual-review-2017.pdf.
21. See United States v. Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1, 6 (1998).
22. Paul Mogin, “Fundamental Since Our Country's Founding”: United States v.
Auernheimer and the Sixth Amendment Right to Be Tried in the District in Which the
Alleged Crime Was Committed, 6 U. DENV. CRIM. L. REV. 37, 40–41 (2016).
23. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20 (U.S. 1776); see The Declaration of
Independence: The Twenty-Seven Grievances, J. AM. REVOLUTION (July 4, 2019),
https://allthingsliberty.com/2019/07/the-declaration-of-independence-the-twenty-sevengrievances/.
24. See United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 327 (3d Cir. 2002) (“Proper venue is a
safeguard that is guaranteed twice in the Constitution.”).
25. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
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in Cases of Impeachment . . . shall be held in the State where the said
Crimes shall have been committed.”26 The Sixth Amendment further
protects a person accused of a crime, guaranteeing proper venue at a district
level.27 This amendment specifies that the accused has the right to be tried
in “the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.”28
While the Sixth Amendment originally functioned as a vicinage provision
to guarantee a local jury,29 there is no modern practical distinction between
the Sixth Amendment vicinage provision and Article III venue
protections.30
Venue protections are further codified in Rule 18 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.31 Rule 18 requires the government to “prosecute an
offense in a district where the offense was committed” unless otherwise
permitted by statute or federal rule.32 This rule does not change the scope of
proper venue in a criminal trial, but “simply codifies the constitutional
mandates that a defendant be tried in a state where the crime was
committed, before an impartial jury of that district.”33
Although venue was undoubtedly important to the Framers, courts have
struggled to clearly articulate the policies that make venue so crucial.34
Though the Supreme Court has urged courts to respect “the underlying
spirit of the constitutional concern for trial in the vicinage,”35 the Second
Circuit has argued this direction falls short.36 Without precise guidance,
courts have tried to balance the interests of the accused, the government,

26. Id.
27. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
28. Id.
29. William Wirt Blume, The Place of Trial of Criminal Cases: Constitutional Vicinage
and Venue, 43 MICH. L. REV. 59, 60 (1944).
30. Robert L. Ullmann, One Hundred Years After Hyde: Time to Expand Venue
Safeguards in Federal Criminal Conspiracy Cases?, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1003, 1007
(2012).
31. FED. R. CRIM. P. 18.
32. Id.
33. United States v. Fry, 413 F. Supp. 1269, 1271 (E.D. Mich. 1976), aff’d, 559 F.2d
1221 (6th Cir. 1977).
34. See United States v. Reed, 773 F.2d 477, 480 (2d Cir. 1985).
35. Note, Criminal Venue in the Federal Courts: The Obstruction of Justice Puzzle, 82
MICH. L. REV. 90, 105 (1983) [hereinafter Obstruction of Justice Puzzle] (quoting United
States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 276 (1944)).
36. See Reed, 773 F.2d at 480 (“[T]he precise policies to be furthered by venue law are
not clearly defined. . . . [T]he Supreme Court has yet to articulate a coherent definition of the
underlying policies.”).
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witnesses, and the courts themselves.37 As a result, several different policy
justifications have guided courts tackling issues of criminal venue.
The first of these broad policy justifications is fairness to the accused.38
Historically, proper venue ensured a fair trial by guaranteeing to the
accused the right to be tried in his community.39 A local trial ensured the
accused had access to relevant evidence to build his case, friends and
relatives to act as character witnesses, and local counsel to prepare a
defense.40 Though these policies may seem outdated now,41 forcing a
defendant to travel to a distant district to present his defense still imposes a
financial burden.42 Venue protections also prevent the government from
winning a conviction by simply separating a defendant from relevant facts,
witnesses, and evidence.43 Without venue protections, the prosecution could
survey unrelated districts to find the jury that would be most sympathetic to
its case. Venue protections aim to preclude that precise “governmental
abuse[] of power.”44 In determining whether venue is fair to the accused,
courts scrutinize whether the government is forum shopping to gain an
advantage.45 In fact, even the mere appearance of governmental abuse in
selecting “what may be deemed a tribunal favorable to the prosecution” has
troubled the Supreme Court.46 A prosecutor intentionally cherry-picking an
unfair district harkens back to King George’s attempts to gain an advantage
by trying colonists in England. This parallel clarifies why courts have no
patience for even a vestige of governmental abuse.

37. Ullmann, supra note 30, at 1009.
38. See United States v. Cores, 356 U.S. 405, 407 (1958) (“The provision for trial in the
vicinity of the crime is a safeguard against the unfairness and hardship involved when an
accused is prosecuted in a remote place.”); see also Johnson, 323 U.S. at 275; United States
v. Busic, 549 F.2d 252, 258 (2d Cir. 1977).
39. Drew L. Kershen, Vicinage, 29 OKLA. L. REV. 801, 808–09 (1976).
40. Id.
41. See United States v. Hart-Williams, 967 F. Supp. 73, 79 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)
(criticizing the Sixth Amendment’s vicinage clause as “a relic of a bygone era when jurors
decided cases on the basis of personal knowledge”).
42. Johnson, 323 U.S. at 278.
43. See Kershen, supra note 39, at 809 (“For any accused, trial at a distant location
would be inconvenient and expensive. For an accused of limited means, trial at a distant
location could, in effect, mean a complete inability to present a defense to the charge.”).
44. United States v. Palma-Ruedas, 121 F.3d 841, 861 (3d Cir. 1997) (Alito, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part), rev’d sub nom. United States v. RodriguezMoreno, 526 U.S. 275 (1999).
45. Mogin, supra note 22, at 58.
46. Johnson, 323 U.S. at 275.
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A second policy justification is fairer administration of justice, which is
ensured by better factfinding.47 Venue is typically only proper in the district
in which the accused committed the crime.48 Because the government must
try the crime in the district where the crime occurred, fact witnesses are
generally more accessible to both the defense and the prosecution.49
Similarly, both parties have better access to evidence in the district where
the criminal behavior occurred because most relevant evidence is likely to
be located there.50 When both the government and the accused have easy,
unobstructed access to evidence and fact witnesses, each can build a case
on the merits. On the other hand, holding “trial in a distant state or territory
might subject the party . . . to the inability of procuring proper witnesses to
establish his innocence.”51
A third major policy justification courts may consider in venue analyses
is convenience.52 In some cases, this policy promotes broadening the scope
of venue to more efficiently administer justice.53 As federal laws have
increased in both quantity and complexity, the government can now charge
a person with several different federal criminal offenses predicated upon the
same underlying behavior.54 Trying these complex cases may require the
government to bring dozens of different charges in several different districts
to ensure proper venue.55 But this justification likely holds little power on
its own. When a prosecutor brings an array of charges based on the same
criminal behavior, courts will not authorize improper venue for any single
charge, even if it is easier and more cost effective for the government to
bring its entire case in one courthouse.56
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

See Obstruction of Justice Puzzle, supra note 35, at 106.
See United States v. Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1, 5 (1998).
Obstruction of Justice Puzzle, supra note 35, at 106.
Id. at 106–07.
Mogin, supra note 22, at 57 (quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION § 1775 (Carolina Acad. Press 1987) (1833)).
52. United States v. Lukashov, 694 F.3d 1107, 1119 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting United
States v. Angotti, 105 F.3d 539, 541–42 (9th Cir. 1997), abrogated by United States v.
Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1 (1998)).
53. See Obstruction of Justice Puzzle, supra note 35, at 108.
54. Mogin, supra note 22, at 59.
55. See id. at 59–60.
56. See United States v. Auernheimer, 748 F.3d 525, 536–37 (3d Cir. 2014) (clarifying
that “substantial contacts” cannot expand the scope of venue but can only limit it); see also
Christopher W. Pratt, Comment, “I’m Being Prosecuted Where?” Venue Under 18 U.S.C. §
924(C)(1), 37 HOUS. L. REV. 893, 920 (2000) (“The government’s having limited resources
does not justify a public policy argument for compromising a defendant’s constitutional right
to a trial in the district where the crime is committed.”).
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II. Each Branch’s Role in Venue
All three branches of government play an important role in determining
and enforcing proper venue—either by action or inaction. This section will
explore how the legislative, executive, and judicial branches each interpret
venue protections generally and as they relate to sky crimes.
A. The Legislative Branch
When writing new legislation, Congress can designate proper venue by
including an express venue provision within a statute.57 In the absence of
such a provision, proper venue is instead determined by “the locus delicti,
or scene of the crime.”58 To establish the locus delicti, courts consider the
“nature of the crime alleged and the location of the act or the acts
constituting it.”59 Because Congress chooses which specific behavior to
criminalize when drafting federal statutes, legislators implicitly define the
locus delicti when they designate the acts constituting a crime. Without an
express venue provision, therefore, courts analyzing a venue challenge must
instead look to the specific behavior that Congress chose to criminalize.60
Congress may also expressly define the locus delicti of a particular crime.61
Though technically different than an express venue provision, a defined
locus delicti similarly eliminates the court’s need to determine the criminal
acts constituting the offense.
Though Congress has not passed a widely applicable venue statute for
crimes committed on airplanes, it has codified jurisdictional requirements
for crimes committed in the “special aircraft jurisdiction of the United

57. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1956(i)(A) (2018) (specifying that money laundering charges
may be brought in “any district in which the financial or monetary transaction” occurred); 21
U.S.C. § 17 (2018) (limiting venue for mislabeling dairy or food products to the district in
which the mislabeling occurred); 18 U.S.C. § 1512(i) (2018) (specifying that charges for
witness tampering “may be brought” either in the district where the proceeding “was
intended to be affected” or in the district where the obstructive behavior occurred).
58. 8A BARBARA J. VAN ARSDALE ET AL., FEDERAL PROCEDURE: LAWYERS EDITION §
22:64 (2015), 8A Fed. Proc., L. Ed. § 22:64 (Westlaw).
59. Id.; United States v. Kirk Tang Yuk, 885 F.3d 57, 69 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. denied
sub nom. Thomas v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 342 (2018), and cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 342
(2018) (quoting United States v. Tzolov, 642 F.3d 314, 318 (2d Cir. 2011)).
60. See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33223, VENUE: A LEGAL
ANALYSIS OF WHERE A FEDERAL CRIME MAY BE TRIED 3 (2018).
61. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3236 (2018) (defining the locus delicti for manslaughter as
“the place where the injury was inflicted, or the poison administered or other means
employed which caused the death, without regard to the place where the death occurs”).
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States.”62 This mechanism allows traditional state crimes—like murder63
and assault64—to be tried in federal court, thereby eliminating the need to
determine which state has jurisdiction over the crime.65
B. The Executive Branch
The executive branch’s role in venue determinations is triggered when a
prosecutor decides to file federal charges in a particular district. Federal
prosecutors, part of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) under the executive
branch,66 carry the burden of proof to show that venue is proper in criminal
trials.67 Because proper venue is typically not viewed as “an ‘element’ of
the crime,”68 it must only be proven “by a preponderance of the
evidence.”69 Whether venue is proper is a question of fact.70
Additionally, the DOJ’s Justice Manual71 provides internal guidance to
prosecutors by clarifying DOJ policies and procedures.72 Though it does not
carry the force of law, the Deputy Attorney General prepares the Justice
Manual under the supervision of the Attorney General.73 The Justice
Manual’s Criminal Resource Manual (“CRM”) specifically contemplates
the issue of venue for sky crimes, arguing that venue should be “proper in
62. 49 U.S.C. § 46506 (2018); see infra Section V.A.
63. See 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (2018) (federally criminalizing murder on airplanes).
64. See 18 U.S.C. § 113 (2018) (federally criminalizing simple assault on airplanes); 18
U.S.C. § 2244 (2018) (federally criminalizing sexual assaults on airplanes).
65. United States v. Georgescu, 723 F. Supp. 912, 913 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
66. Melissa McNamara, The Role of U.S. Attorneys, CBS NEWS (Mar. 19, 2007, 12:22
PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-role-of-us-attorneys/.
67. United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 328 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing United States v.
Black Cloud, 590 F.2d 270, 272 (8th Cir. 1979)).
68. See, e.g., United States v. Conteh, 2 F. App’x 202, 203 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[V]enue is
not an ‘element’ of the crime in the formal sense.” (citing United States v. Smith, 198 F.3d
377, 382 (2d. Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 864 (2000))); United States v. Miller, 111
F.3d 747, 752 (10th Cir. 1997) (outlining the “significant differences between venue and
substantive elements of the crime”); United States v. Massa, 686 F.2d 526, 530 (7th Cir.
1982) (“[V]enue . . . is an element more akin to jurisdiction than to the substantive elements
of the crime.”).
69. United States v. Lukashov, 694 F.3d 1107, 1120 (9th Cir. 2012).
70. Id.
71. The Justice Manual was previously known as the United States Attorneys’ Manual.
Wick Sollers et al., DOJ Issues Updated U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, AM. BAR ASS’N (Feb. 5,
2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/criminal/practice/2019/
doj-issues-updated-us-attorneys-manual/.
72. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL § 1-1.100–200 (2018), https://www.justice.
gov/jm/jm-1-1000-introduction.
73. Id. § 1-1.200.
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the district in which the aircraft land[s].”74 Though this guidance is not
binding on the courts, judges may still give weight to it by treating the
CRM as persuasive authority in sky crime cases.75
C. The Judicial Branch
Courts must analyze each individual venue challenge based on the
specific statute and facts involved.76 Even if Congress has included a venue
provision in the statute at issue, the court must still ensure that the provision
operates within the scope of Article III and the Sixth Amendment.77 An
extra layer of complexity arises when criminal behavior spans across
multiple districts. Though several circuit courts and the Supreme Court
have addressed this issue, competing standards have emerged and some
confusion still remains.
1. The Substantial Contacts Test
The Second Circuit has taken a broader approach to venue when “the
acts constituting the crime and the nature of the crime charged implicate
more than one location.”78 In United States v. Reed, the court grappled with
the imprecise policy justifications underlying proper venue.79 The Reed
court ultimately concluded that “fairness to defendants cannot be the sole
grounds for determining venue because the most convenient venue for them
may often have little, if any, connection with the crimes charged.”80 Instead,
the court adopted a “substantial contacts rule,” which considered four
factors: (1) “the site of the defendant’s acts,” (2) “the elements and nature
of the crime,” (3) “the locus of the effect of the criminal conduct,” and (4)
“the suitability of each district for accurate factfinding.”81 After Reed, the

74. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL: CRIMINAL RESOURCE
MANUAL § 1406 (1999), https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual1406-aircraft-piracy-interference-and-other-title-49-aircraft-offenses [hereinafter CRIMINAL
RESOURCE MANUAL].
75. See Kristie Xian, The Price of Justice: Deferred Prosecution Agreements in the
Context of Iranian Sanctions, 28 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 631, 649 n.123
(2014) (“As internal policy manuals, the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual and U.S. Department of
Justice Criminal Resource Manual . . . are given weight based upon their power to
persuade.”) (citations omitted).
76. See, e.g., United States v. Ebersole, 411 F.3d 517, 524 (4th Cir. 2005).
77. See United States v. Reed, 773 F.2d 477, 480 (2d Cir. 1985).
78. Id.
79. See id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 481.
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Second Circuit “alternately applied and ignored the substantial contacts
test.”82 While the Sixth,83 Fourth,84 and Seventh85 Circuits have used or
cited the test with approval,86 the Tenth87 and Third88 Circuits have both
expressly rejected it. Two decades after Reed, the Supreme Court
introduced a new test in United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno.89 While the
Rodriguez-Moreno test did not explicitly overrule the substantial contacts
test, the Second Circuit’s approach has certainly “lost force as precedent.”90
2. The Essential Conduct Elements Test
The Supreme Court weighed in on the process for determining proper
venue in Rodriguez-Moreno.91 There, an east coast drug dealer stole
cocaine from a distributor during a drug deal in Texas.92 The distributor
then hired the defendant and others to track down the drug dealer.93 In an
effort to find the drug dealer, the defendant held a middleman hostage on a
trip from Texas to the east coast.94 After spending several days in New
Jersey, the kidnappers then took the middleman to New York, and finally to
Maryland.95 After arriving in Maryland, the defendant obtained a pistol,
held the gun to the middleman’s head, and threatened to shoot.96 The
middleman eventually escaped and called the police, who arrested the
kidnappers.97 The defendant was charged with conspiring to kidnap the

82. United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 80 (2d Cir. 2012).
83. See United States v. Zidell, 323 F.3d 412, 423 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v.
Williams, 788 F.2d 1213, 1215 (6th Cir. 1986).
84. See United States v. Cofield, 11 F.3d 413, 417 (4th Cir. 1993). But see United States
v. Bowens, 224 F.3d 302, 312 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Our reasoning in Cofield, however, cannot
be reconciled with the Supreme Court’s later decisions in Cabrales and Rodriguez–
Moreno.”).
85. See United States v. Muhammad, 502 F.3d 646, 652 (7th Cir. 2007).
86. Mogin, supra note 22, at 39.
87. United States v. Smith, 641 F.3d 1200, 1208 (10th Cir. 2011).
88. United States v. Auernheimer, 748 F.3d 525, 536–37 (3d Cir. 2014).
89. 526 U.S. 275 (1999).
90. David Spears, Venue in Federal Criminal Cases: A Strange Duck, CHAMPION,
Jan./Feb. 2019, at 24, 28.
91. 526 U.S. at 279–80. One year earlier, the Court promulgated a similar rule in
relation to a money laundering statute in United States v. Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1998).
92. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. at 276.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 276–77.
95. Id. at 277.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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middleman, kidnapping the middleman, and “using and carrying a firearm
in relation to” the kidnapping.98 The government brought the charges in the
District of New Jersey, but the defendant argued that venue for the firearm
charge was improper because Maryland was the only place the government
could prove “he had actually used a gun.”99
The Third Circuit, relying on the specific verbs in the statute, agreed
with the defendant’s argument that venue for the firearms charge was
improper in New Jersey.100 The government had prosecuted the defendant
under a statute that barred “us[ing] or carr[ying] a firearm” “during and in
relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime.”101 The court
reasoned that since the defendant only “used” or “carried” the gun in
Maryland, venue would only be proper there.102 Because its ruling would
force prosecutors to try the gun crime in a different venue than the
kidnapping crime, the court’s approach eschewed judicial economy in favor
of strict constitutional venue protections.
The Supreme Court disagreed and reversed the Third Circuit, holding
that venue was proper in New Jersey for both the kidnapping and the
firearm charges.103 The Court, reasoning that any venue inquiry must begin
with determining the locus delicti of the crime,104 set forth a two-prong test
for making this determination.105 First, a court must “identify the conduct
constituting the offense,” and then it must “discern the location of the
commission” of that conduct.106 While the lower court relied on the specific
verbs within the statute to satisfy the first prong of the test, the Supreme
Court took a broader approach to identifying the criminalized conduct.107
Rather than analyzing verbs alone, the Court looked at the “essential
conduct elements” of the crime.108 In the Court’s view, the venue inquiry
turns on whether the statutory language constitutes an element of the crime
the government must prove to win its case, regardless of the words’
grammatical properties.109 Using this lens, the Court found two “essential
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 278.
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2018).
Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. at 278.
Id. at 281–82.
See id. at 279; see supra Section II.A.
Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. at 279.
Id.
See id. at 279–80.
Id. at 280.
See id.
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conduct elements” in the statute at issue: (1) using a firearm and (2)
committing a crime of violence—in this case, a kidnapping.110 The Court
reasoned that because the kidnapping began in Texas and continued through
New Jersey, New York, and Maryland, it did not make sense to break the
kidnapping down into “discrete geographic fragments.”111 Because the
statute criminalized using a gun “during and in relation to” the kidnapping,
the Court held that venue was proper in any district in which the underlying
violent crime—the kidnapping—occurred.112
In Rodriguez-Moreno, the Court also determined that kidnapping
qualifies as a “continuing offense” under 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a).113 When
criminal behavior takes place in more than one district, venue is proper in
“any district in which such offense was begun, continued, or completed.”114
Under § 3237(a), crimes involving interstate commerce qualify as
continuing offenses.115 As a result, venue is proper for those crimes in “any
district from, through, or into which such commerce . . . moves.”116
III. Two Approaches to Venue for Crimes Committed
on Domestic Commercial Flights
Courts disagree, however, on whether § 3237(a)’s reach extends to every
crime committed during a commercial flight. The Ninth Circuit has
concluded that the criminal behavior itself must implicate interstate
commerce in order to qualify as a continuing offense.117 The Tenth and
Eleventh Circuits have held that any criminal behavior occurring during
interstate travel automatically qualifies as a continuing offense and
therefore falls within § 3237(a)’s purview.118 The Supreme Court has not
yet weighed in on the issue, resulting in a circuit split.

110. Id.
111. Id. at 281.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 282.
114. 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) (2018).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See United States v. Lozoya, 920 F.3d 1231, 1240 (9th Cir.), reh'g en banc granted,
944 F.3d 1229 (9th Cir. 2019), and on reh'g en banc, No. 17-50336, 2020 WL 7064635 (9th
Cir. Dec. 3, 2020).
118. See United States v. Cope, 676 F.3d 1219, 1225 (10th Cir. 2012); United States v.
Breitweiser, 357 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. McCulley, 673 F.2d
346, 349–50 (11th Cir. 1982).
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A. Ninth Circuit’s Approach: Flyover District Only
The Ninth Circuit has adopted a narrow interpretation of venue in
relation to sky crimes. Its approach requires the government to prosecute
the crime in the district the plane was flying above when the criminal
behavior occurred.119
In Lozoya, one passenger struck another in the face during a flight from
Minneapolis to Los Angeles during a skirmish that began and ended in an
instant.120 The Ninth Circuit relied on the two-prong test set forth in
Rodriguez-Moreno to determine the locus delicti of the criminal offense.121
In applying that test, the court first established the essential elements of the
criminal conduct and then determined where that conduct occurred.122
Lozoya deviated from the norm because the first half of the analysis was
very straightforward.123 The specific conduct criminalized—the slap—was
undisputed and clear cut.124 To satisfy the second prong of the test, the court
considered two separate statutes to ascertain the district in which the slap
occurred.125
The government first contended the crime was a continuing offense
under 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a), so venue was proper in the district where the
plane landed.126 Section 3237(a) provides that an offense involving “the use
of . . . transportation in interstate or foreign commerce . . . is a continuing
offense and . . . may be inquired of and prosecuted in any district from,
through, or into which such commerce . . . moves.”127 A continuing offense
may be “prosecuted in any district in which such offense was begun,
continued, or completed.”128
The crux of the government’s argument under § 3237(a) was that the
assault charge involved interstate commerce because it occurred on a
commercial flight that moved passengers between states.129 The Ninth
Circuit disagreed, noting that even though the assault happened on a plane,
nothing about the charged criminal behavior itself implicated interstate
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Lozoya, 920 F.3d at 1241.
Id. at 1233–34; see also supra notes 5–11 and accompanying text.
Lozoya, 920 F.3d at 1238–39; see supra Section II.C.2.
Lozoya, 920 F.3d at 1239.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 1239, 1241.
Id. at 1239.
18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) (2018).
Id. (emphasis added).
Lozoya, 920 F.3d at 1240.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021

384

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:371

commerce.130 The court reasoned that the criminalized behavior “occurred
in an instant” and was over long before the plane entered the Central
District of California for its landing at LAX.131 Because the plane’s
subsequent flight activity was separate from the actual criminal behavior,
the court concluded it was “incidental and therefore irrelevant for venue
purposes.”132 The court deemed the fact that the crime occurred on an
airplane merely a “circumstance element,” as opposed to an element of the
crime.133 Because only criminalized behavior can support proper venue, the
fact that the slap occurred on an airplane did not somehow convert it to a
continuing offense under § 3237(a), and venue was therefore improper in
the arrival district.134 The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that its decision
created a circuit split with the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, but it ultimately
declined to treat § 3237(a) as a “catchall provision” for all crimes
committed on airplanes.135
The government next argued that venue was proper because the crime
was not committed in any district.136 When crimes are “begun or
committed . . . out of the jurisdiction of any particular State or district,”
venue is proper “in the district in which the offender . . . is arrested or is
first brought.”137 The court quickly disposed of this argument because the
statute only applies when an “offense [is] committed entirely on the high
seas or outside the United States.”138 The court distinguished the “high
skies” from the “high seas” because “the navigable airspace above [a]
district is a part of the district.”139
Under the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation, venue was proper only in the
district “above which the assault occurred.”140 Though the government
urged that pinpointing the exact location of the plane during the assault
would be “impossible,” the court rejected that argument.141 Conceding that
it would require some investigation to determine the plane’s location, the
130. Id. at 1239–40.
131. Id. at 1239.
132. Id. (citing United States v. Stinson, 647 F.3d 1196, 1204 (9th Cir. 2011)).
133. Id. at 1240 (quoting Stinson, 647 F.3d at 1204).
134. Id. at 1239.
135. Id. at 1240 (quoting United States v. McCulley, 673 F.2d 346, 350 (11th Cir. 1982)).
136. Id. at 1241.
137. 18 U.S.C. § 3238 (2018).
138. Lozoya, 920 F.3d at 1241 (quoting United States v. Pace, 314 F.3d 344, 351 (9th
Cir. 2002)).
139. Id. (quoting United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 911 (9th Cir. 1973)).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1241–42.
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court still felt the government’s task—proving venue by a preponderance of
the evidence—was a “wholly reasonable” one for it to tackle.142
The Ninth Circuit did recognize the “creeping absurdity in [its]
holding.”143 But rather than adopting what it believed to be the more
practical rule, the court instead urged Congress to act by passing legislation
to address the issue in a “just, sensible, and clearly articulated” rule.144
B. Tenth & Eleventh Circuits’ Approach: Departure District, Any Flyover
District, or Arrival District
The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have taken a broader approach to
interpreting venue for crimes committed on commercial flights. While the
Ninth Circuit limited proper venue to a single flyover district,145 the Tenth
and Eleventh Circuits have held that venue for sky crimes is proper in the
landing district, the departure district, and any flyover district.146
The Eleventh Circuit first addressed the issue in United States v.
McCulley.147 In that case, three men conspired to steal United States mail
during a nonstop flight from Los Angeles to Atlanta.148 One of the men
locked himself in a trunk, unbeknownst to airline employees who loaded
the trunk near several mail bags in the belly of the plane.149 During the
flight, the man freed himself from the trunk, tore open the bags, and
pilfered through the mail.150 He then loaded stolen mail into his own
luggage, which was intended for transfer onto a connecting flight.151 After
the plane landed in Atlanta, however, airline employees discovered the man
when his trunk popped open during baggage unloading.152 The conspiracy
142. Id. at 1242.
143. Id. (“Should it really be necessary for the government to pinpoint where precisely in
the spacious skies an alleged assault occurred? Imagine an inflight robbery or homicide—or
some other nightmare at 20,000 feet—that were to occur over the northeastern United States,
home to three circuits, fifteen districts, and a half-dozen major airports, all in close
proximity. How feasible would it be for the government to prove venue in such cluttered
airspace?”).
144. Id. at 1243.
145. Id. at 1241.
146. See United States v. Cope, 676 F.3d 1219, 1225 (10th Cir. 2012); United States v.
Breitweiser, 357 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. McCulley, 673 F.2d
346, 349–50 (11th Cir. 1982).
147. 673 F.2d at 349.
148. Id. at 348.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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unraveled after employees realized that several mail bags were missing and
that there was other luggage resembling the trunk, which investigators used
to bait the man’s co-conspirators.153 Police arrested all three men in the
Northern District of Georgia—the district where the plane landed.154
Prosecutors in the Northern District brought charges under several federal
statutes,155 including 18 U.S.C. § 1706, which prohibits injury to mail bags
“with the intent to rob or steal any such mail.”156
Only the two co-conspirators who were not in the trunk raised venue
challenges.157 They argued venue would only be proper in the Northern
District of Georgia if the government could prove either that the criminal
conduct was a continuing offense under 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) or that the men
injured the bags in that district.158 The court rejected their argument,
holding any violation of § 1706 that “occurs on some form of transportation
in interstate or foreign commerce” automatically qualifies as a “continuing
violation” under § 3237(a).159 To hold otherwise would allow “a crime
which has been committed in transit from escaping punishment” solely
because the government could not satisfy the venue requirement.160 The
court believed the scenario at hand was “precisely [the] sort of situation that
18 U.S.C. § 3237 was meant to deal with.”161 Section 3237(a), the court
reasoned, functioned as a “catchall provision” to relieve Congress from
“insert[ing] venue provisions in every statute where venue might be
difficult to prove.”162
While the Eleventh Circuit did consider the potential complications
presented by the Sixth Amendment and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
18,163 the court ultimately relied on the policy justifications underlying
those rules to support its stance.164 Specifically, venue protections function
to “prevent abuses” such as forcing a person who committed a robbery in
one state to face a jury trial in a different state.165 The court distinguished
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id.
See id. at 349.
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 1706 (2018).
McCulley, 673 F.2d at 349.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 350.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 350 n.2; see supra Part I.
McCulley, 673 F.2d at 350 n.2.
Id.
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the instant case because the conspirators “voluntarily entered the Northern
District of Georgia with the intent to further the ends of the conspiracy.” 166
Because its broad interpretation of § 3237(a) did not implicate the abuses
contemplated by constitutional safeguards, the Eleventh Circuit believed its
holding did not undermine the Sixth Amendment or Rule 18.167
IV. Both Existing Approaches Are Unworkable for Sky Crimes
The Ninth Circuit’s strict interpretation of venue requirements produces
absurd results and puts an unreasonably high burden on the government to
prove venue for crimes committed on airplanes. While the Tenth and
Eleventh Circuits’ approach seems more sensible on its face, allowing such
a broad range of venue options gives the government too much latitude and
infringes upon defendants’ constitutional rights.
A. The Ninth Circuit’s “Too Narrow” Approach
Under the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Lozoya, venue for noncontinuous
sky crimes is only proper in the district above which the plane was flying
when the crime occurred. This approach creates unnecessary hardships and
produces undesirable results. Specifically, it may pose an insurmountable
hurdle for the government, run contrary to constitutional and congressional
goals, make it more difficult for victims to get redress, produce inconsistent
results, and disregard other procedural safeguards.
The Ninth Circuit’s narrow interpretation of venue places a high burden
on the government and compels prosecutors to bring charges for crimes
committed on airplanes in an arbitrary district. The government must first
identify the moment that the criminal behavior occurred and then determine
the precise location of the airplane at that point in time.168 Though
technological advances allow relatively easy access to information about a
plane’s physical location,169 a narrow interpretation still raises unnecessary
hurdles.
Pinpointing the location of the plane at the moment of the crime forces
the government to put an exact timestamp on the criminal behavior.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See United States v. Lozoya, 920 F.3d 1231, 1242 (9th Cir.), reh'g en banc granted,
944 F.3d 1229 (9th Cir. 2019), and on reh'g en banc, No. 17-50336, 2020 WL 7064635 (9th
Cir. Dec. 3, 2020).
169. See Robert Silk, All Commercial Aircraft in U.S. Will Soon Have GPS Technology,
TRAVEL WKLY. (Dec. 17, 2019), https://www.travelweekly.com/Travel-News/Airline-News/
Commercial-aircraft-GPS-technology.
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Admittedly, this requirement did not present a problem in Lozoya because
the commotion immediately alerted flight attendants and other passengers
who were able to document the time.170 But if a defendant acted less
overtly, determining the precise time the behavior occurred could present
an insurmountable hurdle.
Imagine that instead of two adults openly brawling on a plane, the crime
involved an adult passenger quietly preying on an unaccompanied minor. If
the child failed to immediately alert a flight attendant or note the time of the
assault, the government may lack the information necessary to prove proper
venue.171 The difficulty of this task would also depend on the plane’s flight
path. A prosecutor would have a much smaller margin of error for flights
traversing the east coast—where federal judicial districts are more densely
packed—because the plane would fly over each district for a shorter
duration. The hypothetical child’s access to justice should not rest on her
ability to recall enough details surrounding her assault to determine whether
it happened at 6 p.m. or 7 p.m. Though the government carries a lower
burden of proof for venue than it does for other elements of the crime, 172
circumstances like these could still make it impossible to meet that burden.
While venue requirements generally protect a defendant from
prosecution in an unfair district,173 a rigid and literal interpretation of venue
on airplanes flouts those fairness concerns. A narrow interpretation could
actually force the government to bring charges in an unfamiliar district
hundreds of miles away from relevant evidence, witnesses, or parties. For
every cross-country flight between two major cities, it is likely that many of
the passengers live in either the city the plane took off from or the city
where it landed.174 While some passengers may be visiting for the first time
or catching a connecting flight, most probably have some business or
personal connection to either the departure or arrival city. In contrast, far
fewer passengers are likely to live in, work in, or be familiar with any given
district over which the plane flies. Moreover, forcing proper venue in a
170. See Lozoya, 920 F.3d at 1242 (explaining the specific circumstances that allowed
flight attendants to determine the time of the assault).
171. Federal jurisdiction is proper for sexual assaults committed on airplanes under 18
U.S.C. § 2244 (2018).
172. United States v. Lukashov, 694 F.3d 1107, 1120 (9th Cir. 2012); Spears, supra note
90, at 24.
173. See supra Part I.
174. For example, Lozoya was flying back to California because she had to work the
following day. Brief for Appellant at 11, United States v. Lozoya, 920 F.3d 1291 (2019)
(No. 17-50336), 2018 WL 1064506, at *11. While her brief does not specify precisely where
she lives, it is likely within driving distance of LAX.
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random flyover district may impede witnesses’ availability to testify in
person. In a dissent, Justice Harlan stressed that proper venue “is a
safeguard against the unfairness and hardship involved when an accused is
prosecuted in a remote place.”175 He further urged courts to construe
statutes in a way that “respect[s] such considerations.”176 In Justice Harlan’s
view, courts give more respect to the Sixth Amendment’s protections by
finding proper venue where “witnesses and relevant circumstances
surrounding the contested issues” are most likely to be found.177
A narrow interpretation not only fails to promote fairness to the
defendant, but also fosters unfairness to victims.178 By placing such a high
burden on the government to bring charges and prove venue in a far-flung
district, a narrow interpretation creates a loophole for criminals to avoid
prosecution. Under the two-prong Rodriguez-Moreno test, courts must: (1)
“identify the conduct constituting the offense” and (2) “discern the location
of the commission” of the criminal conduct.179 In Rodriguez-Moreno, the
uncertainty rested in the first prong as the Court struggled to determine the
behavior Congress intended to criminalize.180 In Lozoya, though, the first
prong was not at issue since the specific conduct being criminalized—the
slap—was not contested.181 Only the second prong, determining where the
slap occurred, was uncertain. Applying the Rodriguez-Moreno framework
to crimes committed on airplanes requires the government to pinpoint the
plane’s precise location at a specific, but potentially unknown time. Even if
the government can prove all other elements of the crime, its case could still
fail if this burden is not met. Additionally, forcing prosecutors to obtain and
review flight records just to determine which district has proper venue
expends time and resources not required if the defendant is simply charged
175. Travis v. United States, 364 U.S. 631, 640 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting
United States v. Cores, 356 U.S. 405, 407 (1958)).
176. Id. (quoting Cores, 356 U.S. at 407).
177. Id.
178. The Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]he criminal justice system is not
operated primarily for the benefit of victims, but for the benefit of society as a whole.” Kelly
v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 52 (1986). But a glaring loophole in criminal procedure laws that
creates a safe harbor for crime on airplanes arguably works to the detriment of all travelers,
not just individual victims.
179. United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. 275, 279 (1999); see supra Section
II.C.2.
180. See Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. at 281.
181. See United States v. Lozoya, 920 F.3d 1231, 1239 (9th Cir.), reh'g en banc granted,
944 F.3d 1229 (9th Cir. 2019), and on reh'g en banc, No. 17-50336, 2020 WL 7064635 (9th
Cir. Dec. 3, 2020).
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in the district where the plane lands. As a result, requiring the government
to pinpoint the plane’s physical location may act as an obstacle for victims
seeking redress.
The Framers could not possibly have contemplated commercial airflight
when they drafted constitutional venue protections. Congress, however, has
passed certain legislation that points to its intention to avoid this tricky
venue scenario. In his separate opinion in Lozoya, Judge Owens suggested
that Congress already addressed many of the concerns associated with
commercial air travel when it passed the Federal Aviation Act of 1961. 182
At the time, the administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration
highlighted the exact concern eventually presented in Lozoya:
[S]erious legal questions can arise as to the situs of the aircraft at
the time the crime was committed. The question as to the law of
which jurisdiction should apply to a given offense can be the
subject of endless debate, and excessive delay in the prosecution
becomes inevitable. The difficulties encountered by the
overflown State in collecting evidence sufficient to support an
indictment are obvious. . . . To contrast, if the offense were also
a crime under Federal law, the aircraft would be met on landing
by Federal officers. The offender could be taken into custody
immediately and the criminal prosecution instituted.183
Though the factual scenario envisioned by the administrator came to
fruition in Lozoya, the court’s narrow interpretation of venue inhibited the
desired and intended result.
A narrow venue rule also produces inconsistent results when the assault
occurs above water instead of above land.184 Thus, the government’s ability
to satisfy proper venue could hinge on an air traffic controller’s fortuitous
decision to route an east coast flight over the Atlantic rather than the
Beltway.185 A crime that occurred on a plane flying above water would
most likely be tried in the landing district since crimes occurring over the
ocean technically do not occur in any district.186 But if the same behavior
occurred on a plane that took the land route, the government would have to

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

See id. at 1243–44 (Owens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 1244 (quoting S. REP. NO. 87-694, at 2–3 (1961)); see infra Section V.A.
CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 74, § 1406.
Id.
Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3238 (2018).
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pinpoint the location of the plane at the moment of the assault and
prosecute the defendant in a potentially unfamiliar district.187
Finally, a narrow interpretation needlessly disregards another procedural
safeguard that promotes fairness to the defendant—venue transfer. The
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allow criminal defendants to move to
transfer trial proceedings to a different district.188 The court must grant a
transfer if prejudice in the original district eliminates the defendant’s ability
to “obtain a fair and impartial trial there.”189 Even if the defendant is not
facing such prejudice, he can still move to transfer the case for “the
convenience of the parties, any victim, and the witnesses, and in the interest
of justice.”190 When considering whether to grant a motion to transfer for
convenience, courts have “substantial discretion to balance any competing
interests.”191 If a defendant successfully moves for a transfer, the judge then
selects the transferee district.192 Rule 21 empowers the court to weigh all
relevant factors and decide whether venue would be more appropriate in a
different district.193 Rule 21 does not solve the venue puzzle as it relates to
airplane crimes, though, because a defendant retains his constitutional
venue protections until he moves for venue transfer.194 Thus, only after a
defendant makes a Rule 21 motion does he waive his constitutional right to
be tried in the district where the crime occurred.195
B. The Tenth & Eleventh Circuits’ “Too Broad” Approach
Though a narrow interpretation of venue protections raises concerns, so
too does an overbroad interpretation. Specifically, this approach presents
opportunities for prosecutorial abuse, weakens already vulnerable
constitutional protections, and allows judges to legislate from the bench.

187. CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 74, § 1406.
188. FED. R. CRIM. P. 21.
189. FED. R. CRIM. P. 21(a).
190. FED. R. CRIM. P. 21(b).
191. FED. R. CRIM. P. 21(b) advisory committee’s note to 2010 amendment.
192. FED. R. CRIM. P. 21(b) advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment.
193. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 21(b) advisory committee’s note to 2010 amendment.
Empowering the court to balance interests in a particular factual scenario is reminiscent of
the substantial contacts venue rule in Reed. See supra Section II.C.1.
194. FED. R. CRIM. P. 21(a)–(b) advisory committee’s note to 1944 amendment.
195. Id.
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The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have held that venue for sky crimes is
proper in any district through which a plane travels.196 Rather than
distinguishing between crimes that are ongoing and those that take place in
an instant, these courts have held that all crimes committed on commercial
flights fall under § 3237(a) because they inherently involve interstate
commerce.197 This broad approach to sky-crime venue is ripe for
prosecutorial abuse because it allows the government to choose between
several districts even though the crime happened in only one location. Since
all airplane crimes implicate “the use of . . . interstate or foreign commerce”
under § 3237(a), venue is therefore proper “in any district from, through, or
into which such commerce . . . moves.”198 Under this interpretation, the
government could choose to bring charges in the district where the plane
departed, in the district where the plane arrived, or in any district in which it
flew above.
This approach is troubling because the government’s burden to prove
proper venue is already lower than its burden to prove the elements of the
crime.199 Though the government must prove the elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt, it must only prove proper venue by a
preponderance of evidence.200 Eroding the protection even further risks
transforming venue into a mere formality in defiance of Supreme Court
guidance.201 Unlike many other procedural safeguards in the criminal
justice system, a defendant may waive his objection to venue if the
objection is untimely.202 Thus, the scope of a defendant’s constitutional
venue protection is already limited, and the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’
approach constrains it even further.
This broader approach also arguably allows the court to legislate from
the bench. The Eleventh Circuit in McCulley interpreted § 3237(a) as a
“catchall provision” for venue.203 Its scant analysis, however, relied entirely
196. See United States v. Cope, 676 F.3d 1219, 1225 (10th Cir. 2012); United States v.
Breitweiser, 357 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. McCulley, 673 F.2d
346, 349–50 (11th Cir. 1982).
197. See Cope, 676 F.3d at 1225; Breitweiser, 357 F.3d at 1253; McCulley, 673 F.2d at
350.
198. 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) (2018) (emphasis added).
199. Spears, supra note 90, at 24.
200. United States v. Lukashov, 694 F.3d 1107, 1120 (9th Cir. 2012); Spears, supra note
90, at 24.
201. See United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 276 (1944) (“Questions of venue in
criminal cases, therefore, are not merely matters of formal legal procedure.”).
202. See United States v. Carreon-Palacio, 267 F.3d 381, 391 (5th Cir. 2001).
203. United States v. McCulley, 673 F.2d 346, 350 (11th Cir. 1982).
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on analogous state statutes rather than constitutional guidance or federal
precedent.204 The court reasoned that the statute was “designed to prevent a
crime which has been committed in transit from escaping punishment for
lack of venue,” though it did not cite any legislative history to support that
claim.205 The Ninth Circuit took issue with the McCulley court’s reliance on
state statutes.206 The Supreme Court has cautioned that “[q]uestions of
venue in criminal cases . . . raise deep issues of public policy in the light of
which legislation must be construed.”207 A court’s interpretation of a statute
“should go in the direction of constitutional policy even though not
commanded by it.”208 In the context of proper venue, this guidance may
encourage courts to favor a narrower construction—one that adheres to the
“underlying spirit of the constitutional concern for trial in the vicinage”—
over a broader construction that may more sensibly justify venue in another
district.209 Thus, if the legislative history of § 3237(a) is genuinely unclear
regarding congressional intent, courts should hesitate to interpret it broadly.
While the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’ approach helps avoid absurd
results, it may also defy the explicit protections guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment, Article III, and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Without clear direction from Congress, judicial decisions about proper
venue must be guided by constitutional protections and federal rules.
V. A Functional Approach: § 3237(a) Encompasses All Sky Crime
It is clear that courts are not free to disregard the plain text of the
Constitution or the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure based solely on
policy or good sense.210 While the default rule under both of these sources
requires a crime to be tried in the district where it was committed, Congress
has the authority to statutorily fix venue for a crime, either by including a
specific venue provision or expressly defining the locus delicti of the
crime.211 Title 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) provides statutory authority for courts to
take a sensible approach to criminal venue on airplanes.
204. See id.
205. Id.
206. See United States v. Lozoya, 920 F.3d 1231, 1240 (9th Cir.), reh'g en banc granted,
944 F.3d 1229 (9th Cir. 2019), and on reh'g en banc, No. 17-50336, 2020 WL 7064635 (9th
Cir. Dec. 3, 2020).
207. United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 276 (1944).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. See supra Part I.
211. See supra Section II.A.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021

394

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:371

Congress’s intent to close the venue loophole in these scenarios is
evidenced by legislative history, the statutory scheme, and existing
comprehensive legislation evidencing a sensible approach to criminal
procedure on airplanes. With this groundwork in mind, courts should adopt
a functional interpretation of § 3237(a). For sky crimes, this interpretation
allows courts to balance competing policy concerns, avoid absurd results,
and shield defendants with the protections envisioned by the Constitution
and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Though the Tenth and
Eleventh Circuits have adopted a similar approach, they did so without
thorough analysis and without expressly tempering § 3237(a)’s scope as it
relates to non-continuous sky crimes. This section provides those missing
pieces.
A. Legislative History
The Lozoya majority, lamenting the absurd result it had reached, stressed
that the venue problem for sky crimes could only be solved by
congressional action, not judicial interpretation.212 But a functional
approach to criminal venue on airplanes flows logically from the legislative
history of § 3237(a). Under that statute, “any offense involving the use
of . . . interstate or foreign commerce . . . except as otherwise expressly
provided by enactment of Congress, may be inquired of and prosecuted in
any district from, through, or into which such commerce . . . or imported
object or person moves.”213 While the Ninth Circuit rejected § 3237(a)’s
application in Lozoya because the criminal offense did not involve interstate
commerce,214 the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits opted to treat it as a catchall
provision, finding proper venue in any district through which the plane
traveled.215 The statute’s legislative history tips in favor of the latter
position.
In closing the jurisdictional loophole that once existed for airplanes,
Congress made clear its intent to also close the corresponding venue
loophole. In the early 1960s, Congress amended the Federal Aviation Act
(“FAA”) to address “gaps in existing law which can operate to provide

212. See United States v. Lozoya, 920 F.3d 1231, 1242–43 (9th Cir.), reh'g en banc
granted, 944 F.3d 1229 (9th Cir. 2019), and on reh'g en banc, No. 17-50336, 2020 WL
7064635 (9th Cir. Dec. 3, 2020).
213. 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) (2018).
214. See supra Section III.A.
215. See supra Section III.B.
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criminals with a haven from prosecution.”216 It accomplished this goal by
bringing certain violent state crime offenses—like murder and assault—
under federal jurisdiction, thereby eliminating the need to determine which
state court had jurisdiction over the crime.217 The accompanying House
Report clarified that “it is necessary and appropriate for the legislation to
have this broad coverage if it is to operate as an effective deterrent to crime
and promote safety in air commerce.”218 Congress identified the issues
posed by trying state crimes after “the advent of high-speed high-altitude
flights of modern jet aircraft [] complicated the problem of establishing
venue for the purposes of prosecution.”219 As a result, it amended the FAA
primarily to “provide federal criminal laws to cover the commission of
certain acts occurring on board an aircraft, thereby solving problems of
venue and jurisdiction which had become complicated by” the emergence
of commercial air travel.220 Just like the jurisdictional complications
recognized by Congress, issues of venue on airplanes similarly allow
“serious offenses [to go] unpunished because it” may be “impossible to
establish to any reasonable degree of accuracy the State over which the
crime was committed.”221
Courts can accomplish this legislative goal while remaining faithful to
the foundational policy concerns which underlie criminal venue. While a
functional approach may potentially give the court a range of venue
options, venue should only be proper in a district where those policies are
served,222 similar to the substantial contacts test advanced by the Second
Circuit in Reed.223 Like that test, the functional balancing approach here
should only serve to limit venue options. To determine proper venue for
non-continuous sky crimes, courts should consider factors like where the
defendant resides, whether he will have access to relevant evidence and
witnesses in the chosen district, and whether the government is forum
shopping to gain an advantage. Because these policy goals are most likely
to be served in the departure or arrival district, courts could begin the

216. United States v. Flum, 518 F.2d 39, 42 (8th Cir. 1975) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 87958, at 3 (1961), as reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2563, 2563).
217. Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 87-958, at 4, 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2563–65).
218. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 87-958, at 4, 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2564).
219. United States v. Moradi, 706 F. Supp. 2d 639, 643–44 (D. Md. 2010) (quoting H.R.
REP. NO. 87-958, at 3–4, 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2564).
220. Id. at 644 (quoting 8A AM. JUR. 2d Aviation § 220) (emphasis added).
221. Id. at 643–44 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 87-958, at 3–4, 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2564).
222. See supra Part I.
223. See supra Section II.C.1.
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inquiry with the presumption that one of those two districts would satisfy
these goals.
This analysis would not necessarily foreclose venue in any flyover
district if the judge determined that the factors weighed in favor of venue
there. This sensible approach allows for judicial discretion, avoiding the
pitfalls of the Ninth Circuit’s rigid interpretation. Unlike the Tenth and
Eleventh Circuits’ approach, where venue is statutorily proper in every
flyover district,224 this approach prioritizes a criminal defendant’s
constitutional rights by empowering courts to detect and deter prosecutorial
abuse or other types of unfairness.
B. Statutory Interpretation
The statutory scheme further evidences Congress’s intent to eliminate
venue loopholes. When interpreting an ambiguous statute, courts “must []
interpret the relevant words not in a vacuum, but with reference to the
statutory context, ‘structure, history, and purpose.’”225 The statutes
surrounding § 3237 similarly aim to eliminate venue loopholes. For
example, § 3238 regulates criminal behavior committed “out of the
jurisdiction of any particular State or district” or those “begun or committed
upon the high seas.”226 Section 3240 fixes venue when offenses are
committed prior to a new district’s creation.227 Section 3242 resolves venue
issues when members of tribes commit certain offenses on reservations.228
These statutes all target situations like the one in Lozoya: outliers where
standard venue rules do not quite fit.
Interpreting § 3237’s scope to encompass all sky crimes also produces
the most sensible result. Consider again the hypothetical scenario where an
unaccompanied minor is quietly assaulted by an adult passenger.229 If this
assault occurred in a bathroom at LAX prior to takeoff, determining venue
would be a nonissue. The perpetrator would be charged and prosecuted in
the judicial district where LAX is located, and the case would fit neatly into
the Rodriguez-Moreno framework. But if the assault instead took place an

224. See supra Section III.B.
225. Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169, 179 (2014) (quoting Maracich v. Spears,
570 U.S. 48, 76 (2013) (resolving a statutory interpretation question using these three tools
and “common sense, which is a fortunate (though not inevitable) side-benefit of construing
statutory terms fairly”).
226. 18 U.S.C. § 3238 (2018).
227. Id. § 3240.
228. Id. § 3242.
229. See supra Section IV.A.
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hour or two later, while the plane was midflight, the perpetrator could slip
through the Lozoya loophole. In that case, the adult’s prosecution would
rely on the child’s ability to recall enough details of the assault to determine
the time at which it occurred—a fact required to prove proper venue under
the Ninth Circuit’s approach—by a preponderance of the evidence.
Under the two-prong test set forth in Rodriguez-Moreno, the government
must first identify the criminal behavior and then identify the district where
that behavior occurred.230 In this hypothetical, even if the government had
ample evidence to prove that the perpetrator assaulted the child, the case
would still fail on the second prong of the test. The perpetrator would evade
prosecution based solely on the lack of evidence about the position of the
plane in relation to some specific instance in time. The Framers included
venue protections in the Constitution in two separate instances in an effort
to prevent the government from unfairly prosecuting its citizens in an
unfamiliar district.231 That intention is not served by allowing crime to go
unpunished simply because it occurs in the skies rather than on the ground.
As the Supreme Court has recognized, “interpretations of a statute which
would produce absurd results are to be avoided if alternative interpretations
consistent with the legislative purpose are available.”232 Here, a more
flexible interpretation of § 3237(a) heeds that guidance.
Admittedly, these tools of statutory interpretation are only applicable
when ambiguity exists in the statute.233 The Ninth Circuit in Lozoya argued
that the plain language of § 3237(a) forecloses a functional approach
because the slap itself was not an “offense involving the use of . . .
interstate or foreign commerce.”234 This textualist argument hinges on what
it means for a crime to “involv[e] the use of . . . interstate commerce,”
which may not be as straightforward as the court assumes. The statute does
not require the offense to go so far as to affect or impact interstate
commerce, but merely to “involv[e]” it. To be sure, the slap itself did not
implicate interstate commerce. But Congress adopted legislation which
transformed traditional state crimes (like murder and assault) into federal

230. See supra notes 105–99 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 24–30 and accompanying text.
232. Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982).
233. See BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004) (“Thus, our
inquiry begins with the statutory text, and ends there as well if the text is unambiguous.”).
234. 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a); United States v. Lozoya, 920 F.3d 1231, 1240 (9th Cir.), reh'g
en banc granted, 944 F.3d 1229 (9th Cir. 2019), and on reh'g en banc, No. 17-50336, 2020
WL 7064635 (9th Cir. Dec. 3, 2020).
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crimes when they are committed on airplanes,235 and commercial flights
undoubtedly implicate interstate commerce. The government charged the
plaintiff in Lozoya under a statute specific to assaults committed in the
special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States.236 In this way, the crime
involves—or “relate[s] closely”237—to interstate commerce.
Courts disagree about how closely the offense must relate to interstate
commerce before § 3237(a) is triggered. Some courts have applied
§ 3237(a) when the criminal behavior has a more attenuated connection to
interstate commerce.238 Other courts have taken a more stringent approach,
requiring a direct connection between the criminal behavior and interstate
commerce.239 The former approach, however, is the best interpretation for
sky assaults like the one at issue in Lozoya. It empowers courts to produce
sensible results that are still grounded in the text of the statute and
supported by canons of statutory interpretation.
C. A Comprehensive Legislative Solution
Existing legislation regarding venue on airplanes also evidences
congressional intent to comprehensively address the problem. When
criminal behavior interferes with a crew member—even briefly—under
certain federal statutes,240 venue is proper in any district in which the

235. See supra Section II.A.
236. See 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(3) (2018).
237. Involve, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/involve
(last visited Oct. 21, 2020).
238. See, e.g., United States v. Cope, 676 F.3d 1219, 1225 (10th Cir. 2012) (“As we
explain below, Mr. Cope was ‘under the influence of alcohol’ during the flight. Because he
was operating a common carrier in interstate commerce, it is immaterial whether he was
“under the influence of alcohol” in Colorado.”); United States v. Breitweiser, 357 F.3d 1249,
1253 (11th Cir. 2004) (“To establish venue, the government need only show that the crime
took place on a form of transportation in interstate commerce.”).
239. See, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 393 F.3d 192, 200 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (finding §
3237(a) inapplicable based solely on the fact that a stolen computer was transported from the
District of Columbia to the defendant’s home in Maryland); United States v. Ayo, 801 F.
Supp. 2d 1323, 1332 (S.D. Ala. 2011) (finding § 3237(a) inapplicable after a defendant in
Louisiana received cash from an undercover police officer in Alabama to settle a gambling
debt, while also distinguishing McCulley and Breitweiser: “[T]he defendant did not accept
the proceeds of credit while it was in transit. Nor is this a case where no venue exists outside
of Section 3237(a).”).
240. See 49 U.S.C. § 46504 (2018) (applying to any person who “assault[s] or
intimidat[es] a flight crew member or flight attendant of the aircraft, interferes with the
performance of the duties of the member or attendant or lessens the ability of the member or
attendant to perform those duties”); 49 U.S.C. § 46506 (2018) (applying certain criminal
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accused’s behavior was disruptive.241 If the behavior is so disruptive that it
forces an unscheduled emergency landing, venue would certainly be proper
in the district in which the plane landed.242 But even behavior that did not
interrupt the flight plan could cause flight crew to monitor the passenger’s
behavior for the remainder of the journey.243 In that case, the accused’s
behavior still disrupted the flight, and venue would therefore be proper in
the arrival district.244
Additionally, questions of criminal venue related to airplane crimes often
involve assaults against other passengers. Title 49 U.S.C. § 46506
criminalizes many such offenses under the “special aircraft jurisdiction of
the United States.”245 From an equity standpoint, it would make sense to
bring the “enclave offenses in the same venue as the interference charge
and join them for trial there.”246 The legislative history of the predecessor to
§ 46506 further indicates the statute was “originally enacted to deal with the
problem that states could not prosecute these offenses because it could not
be proved that the offense took place over the prosecuting state.”247 Thus, a
functional approach to interpreting proper venue for sky crimes minimizes
the problem that Congress specifically passed these statutes to address.248
Indeed, a narrow interpretation of § 3237(a) runs contrary to legislative
goals by causing unnecessary inefficiency and complexity in prosecuting
the behavior.249 Many assaults on other passengers or crew members can
also be tried as federal interference, and venue is proper for those crimes in
the district in which the plane lands.250 But a narrow interpretation of venue
would force the government to pinpoint the precise location of the aircraft
laws to defendants who commit crimes “in the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United
States”).
241. CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 74, § 1406.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. 49 U.S.C. § 46506.
246. CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 74, § 1406.
247. Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 87-958, at 1–4, 9–11 (1961), as reprinted in 1961
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2563, 2563–65, 2570–71).
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.; see also United States v. Hall, 691 F.2d 48, 50 (1st Cir. 1982) (“By contrast,
[defendant] would have us construe § [46506] in a way that would require proof of precisely
where his threats and assaults took place, in a plane traveling across many states at great
speed, high above the earth. Such an interpretation would often make § [46506] difficult to
enforce—precisely the opposite of Congress’s intention in passing it, and the related venue
section.”).
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to determine proper venue for the accompanying assault charge.251 Thus,
the government may be forced to prosecute two crimes predicated on the
same behavior, with the same witnesses, and the same evidence in two
different districts. Taking this existing legislation together with the statutory
scheme and legislative history, courts would best effectuate congressional
intent by interpreting § 3237(a) to cover all sky crimes, including the one at
issue in Lozoya.
Conclusion
Criminal venue on airplanes adds a new twist on a foundational principle
of the American criminal justice system. Courts addressing the problem
have tried to preserve a defendant’s constitutional right to be tried where a
crime occurred without creating a loophole for otherwise guilty parties to
escape legal consequences. These efforts, however, have created inflexible
rules that make the administration of justice more difficult for defendants,
victims, and prosecutors.
While the universe of noncontinuous sky crimes may seem small, the
potential implications are not. Though Lozoya involved a simple assault
between two adults, the Ninth Circuit’s narrow, textual approach could
have devastating implications for sexual assault cases involving
unaccompanied minors. But the Tenth and Eleventh Circuit’s broad
approach, which would empower prosecutors to bring the case in their
preferred flyover district, would impermissibly infringe upon a defendant’s
right to be tried where the crime occurred. This unchecked prosecutorial
power directly implicates the fairness concerns the Sixth Amendment was
designed to protect.
This Comment has argued that courts faced with novel venue questions on
airplanes should focus instead on the underlying policy concerns that
prompted the Framers to enshrine venue protections in the Constitution over
200 years ago. Under § 3237(a), judges should consider the specific facts and
circumstances in each case to select a district that serves those policies—most
likely the district in which either the arrival or departure airport is located.
When judges employ this functional, flexible analysis, they can protect a
defendant’s constitutional rights, ensure the operability of the criminal justice
system in the skies, and close the Lozoya loophole for good.
Allyson Shumaker

251. CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 74, § 1406.
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